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TAKING FAULT WITH NEW YORK'S FAULTBASED DIVORCE: IS THE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL?
RHONA BORK*

INTRODUCTION

New York remains one of a handful of states in the country
where it is still not possible to obtain a no-fault divorce unless
there is the consent of both parties.' Following California's lead
in 1970,2 about half of the states have instituted "pure" no-fault
divorce laws, which provide for divorce upon one party's claim
that "irreconcilable differences have caused the irremediable
Class of January 2002, St. John's University School of Law.
1 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §170 (6) (Consol. 2000) (giving permissible grounds for
divorce); see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (1999) (requiring joint petition with
separation agreement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101(12) (2000) (requiring both parties to
be in agreement on terms of marital dissolution before court will grant no-fault divorce).
See generallyDoris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, FamilyLawin the Fifty States, 21
FAM. L.Q. 417, 440-43 (1988) (pointing out all states have some form of no-fault divorce);
Gary H. Nichols, Covenant Marriage:Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29
U. MEM. L. REV 397, 422 (1999) (stating claim of irreconcilable differences may not be
pursued unilaterally by one party without consent of other); Doris Jonas Freed & Joel R.
Brandes, No More Messin' with Hessen, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 17, 1988, at 3 (stating New York is
only remaining jurisdiction in which "living separate and apart" is not grounds for
divorce).
2 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2310-2311 (Deering 2000); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15 (The Free Press ed., Collier Macmillan Publishers
1985) (stating that under pure no-fault divorce fashioned in California, divorce could be
obtained (1) without grounds, (2) without proving prove fault or guilt or taking any moral
position, (3) by unilateral decision of one spouse, (4) without linking financial awards to
fault, (5) with standards that are gender neutral and (6) with procedures aimed at
reducing adversarial climate and fostering amicable divorce); see also Herbert Jacob, The
Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States, reprintedin
86 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1988) (explaining that no-fault was technical cover for
California's lenient divorce policy which had fostered visible industry of producing
fraudulent evidence of marital fault under old fault statute). See generally Walter
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Pejury,52 VA. L. REV. 32, 85-87 (1966)
(pointing out that no-fault statutes containing "living separate and apart" provision
assure law applies only to those marriages that have ceased to function).
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breakdown of the marriage."3 Of the remaining states, most have
adopted laws that allow for unilateral divorce by one spouse
based upon "living apart and separately" for some specified time
4
period.
The New York statute does not require that fault be proven for
divorce if both parties have consented to a separation
agreement. 5 After living apart for one year and upon substantial
performance of this agreement, the parties can be divorced under
New York law. 6 A mutually agreed upon separation agreement,
substantially performed after one year, is the only means
whereby a no-fault divorce may be secured under the New York
law. 7

If there is no mutual agreement to separate and one spouse
contests the other spouse's action for a divorce, the divorce action
can only be maintained under New York law if a fault ground is
sufficiently pleaded. 8 The practical result of a contested divorce

is that an adversarial proceeding is required in which the
plaintiff must prove the defendant's fault.9 If proven, the court
will impose moral labels on the parties with the defendant
designated as the guilty party, responsible for the divorce, and
3 See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Specter, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of
Welfare Reform, Child Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 807 (1997)
(categorizing States on basis of whether no-fault is sole ground of divorce or one of several
grounds).
See generally Nichols, supra note 1, at 422 (discussing treatment of
irreconcilable differences in marriages under Tennessee law); Peter Nash Swisher,
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 269-71 (1997)
(observing that many state legislatures enacted no-fault divorce without significant
debate); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 79, 93-95 (1991) (identifying certain arguments in favor of no-fault divorce).
4 See Elrod & Specter, supra note 3, at 807 (listing Arkansas and Pennsylvania as
requiring three years; Illinois and Maryland requiring two years; Connecticut and New
Jersey requiring eighteen months; North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia requiring one year, and Louisiana and Vermont requiring six months). See
generally, Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing
Results in Divorce Reform at the Crossroadsin ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE, COLLECTION OF
PAPERS 75 (Law Library 1978) (assessing divorce reform over past twenty years).
5 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §170 (6) (Consol. 2000); see alsoN.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 200
(Consol. 2000) (giving grounds for judicial separation).
6 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §170 (6) (Consol. 2000).
7 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §170 (Consol. 2000).
8 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §170 (1) - (5) (Consol. 2000).
9 See generallyOliverM. Stone, MoralJudgment andMaterialProvisionin Divorce, 3
FAM. L.Q. 371, 371 (1969) (decrying perjury and subterfuge that traditional fault-based
divorce proceedings brought into court); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the
Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 93 (1991) (stating no-fault laws are aimed at
reducing acrimony and stigmatization of parties involved); WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at
911 (explaining divorce reform in California and analyzing its consequences for parties
involved).
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the plaintiff as the "innocent victim."1 0
In 1997, Louisiana became the first state to restore fault-based
divorce with the enactment of the Covenant Marriage Act.l I This
created two marriage options in that state, a standard marriage
and a covenant marriage.12 In the standard marriage, a divorce
can be obtained by either party petitioning and proving to the
court that the parties were living apart and separately for 180
days.1 3 However, if married under the covenant marriage law,
parties can only be divorced under a fault-based regime, similar
to the New York statute. 14 Of more significance, citizens of
Louisiana are given the option of choosing which divorce rules
control through the type of marriage chosen.15 A New York
domiciliary has no such option and under certain circumstances
can be foreclosed by state law from a change of marital status so
long as the persons remains a New York domiciliary.
In a line of cases extending from Griswold v. Connecticut 6
10 See Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to
Reform No-FaultLaw,49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611-13 (1997) (outlining shift in social values
fostering judicial policies which place more authority for regulation of family matters on
parties themselves); Jacob, supra note 2, at 1127 (noting that no-fault divorce was
premised on marital failure as symptom of psychological incompatibility and
maladjustment rather than as indication of sin). See generally Arland Thornton,
ChangingAttitudesToward SeparationandDivorce: Causes and Consequences, 90 AM. J.
Soc. 856, 857 (1985) (claiming couples with strong moral objections to divorce are less
willing to use separation and divorce to resolve unsatisfactory marriage).
II See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:224, 9:272 (West 1999) (defining covenant marriages
and importance of preserving them).
See generally Melissa Lawton, The
Constitutionahtyof Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2471 (1998)
(analyzing coercive effect of Louisiana's covenant marriage law). But see Carl E.
Schneider, MoralDiscourse and the TransformationofAmierican FamilyLaw,83 MICH. L.
REV. 1803, 1805-07 (1985) (discussing forces in American institutions and culture that
have shaped modern family law).
12 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2000) (describing covenant marriage and
stating its requirements); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 87 (West 2000) (stating requirements
for standard marriage); see also Witcher v. Witcher, 639 A-2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994) (holding legislative intent behind Pennsylvania's 1971 reform of Divorce Code to
allow no-fault divorce was to "[glive primary consideration to the welfare of the family
rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs").
See generallySchneider,supra note 11, at 1805-07.
13 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102 (West 1999) (specifying one ground for obtaining
divorce as living apart and separately for 180 days prior).
14 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 2000);
Lawton, supra note 11, at 2475 (noting similarities of divorce under Louisiana Covenant
Act and New York divorce law).
15 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2000) (describing covenant marriage and
stating its requirements); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 87 (West 2000) (stating requirements
for standard marriage); Lawton, supra note 11, at 2475 (noting similarities of divorce
under Louisiana Covenant Act and New York divorce law).
16 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965) (declaring marriage constitutionally protected).
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through Turner v. Safley,'7 the Supreme Court has shielded the
individual's right to marry and the right to divorce from
impermissible encroachment by the state with the protections of
substantive due process derived from Fourteenth Amendment.
This Note considers whether the New York divorce law that
requires fault in contested divorce actions can be found to violate
Constitutional law. Part I examines the grounds that must be
maintained in a contested New York divorce. This examination
will reveal that the outcome of such a contested action may result
in a permanent bar to marital dissolution, depriving the plaintiff
spouse of a remedy under New York law. In Part II, marital
rights will be considered in light of the guarantees afforded by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. While marriage
and divorce are regulated pursuant to state law, which controls
this area by a virtual monopoly, the Constitution guarantees that
the state may not encroach upon an individual's fundamental
rights, which include associational rights, privacy rights and
personal freedoms, all of which are implicated in any deprivation
of marital status. Part III will show that the New York faultbased divorce law is susceptible to attack as constitutionally
unsound as a result of its impingement on these fundamental
freedoms. Part IV will put aside the constitutional imperative for
the sake of analyzing the justifications offered by so-called
women's advocates in defense of this state's divorce law. These
justifications will be found specious and alternatives to promote
equitable and fair outcomes will be suggested that will also
prohibiting
state
mandate
Constitutional
satisfy
the
infringement on individual rights.
I. THE NEW YORK FAULT-BASED DIVORCE LAW
A. The Grounds
To obtain a contested divorce judgment in the New York, the
spouse seeking the divorce must prove either a three-year or
longer imprisonment of the other spouse' 8 or one of three typical
17 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (striking down prison regulation which prohibited inmates
from marrying, on grounds that it violated Constitutional right to marriage).
18 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170 (3) (Consol. 2000) (enumerating grounds for which
spouse can divorce); see also Defeo v. Defeo, 605 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
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fault-based grounds: a showing of (1) cruel and inhuman
treatment,1 9 (2) abandonment 2 0 or (3) adultery by the contesting
spouse. 2 1
1. The Ground of Adultery
Until the Divorce Reform Act of 1966, the sole ground for
divorce in New York had been adultery.22 With the new law,
adultery continued to be a statutory ground 23 carrying with it
both the historical stigma that has attached to it,24 as well as
misdemeanor criminal liability.2 5 While the statute no longer
contains express provision for penalizing the adulterous spouse
in determining spousal maintenance, 26 the court has discretion
where there is egregious conduct to reduce spousal maintenance
(holding incarcerated spouse may maintain action for divorce based on abandonment by
non-incarcerated spouse).
19 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170(1) (Consol. 2000); Delliveneri v. Delliveneri, 710
N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div. 2000) (granting divorce based upon cruel and inhuman
treatment where husband's alcohol abuse, drug abuse, sporadic financial support, and
exposure of plaintiff to communicable disease resulted in wife's major surgery and
depression).
20 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170 (2) (Consol. 2000); Defeo, 159 Misc. 2d at 493
(allowing husband's divorce action to proceed based on wife's abandonment of
incarcerated husband).
21 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170 (4) (Consol. 2000).
22 Until the Divorce Reform Act of 1966, adultery was the only ground for divorce in
New York for 200 years. [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 18-3 to18-5
(David J. Lanser & Judith M. Reichler eds., 2001). This left few options to those who
sought a divorce because they were abused, abandoned or because they had a functionally
dead marriage. Id..Resorting to perjury and to manufacturing charges of adultery was
commonplace, as was collusion of parties in fraud perpetrated on the court when divorce
was mutually desired. Id. For wealthy spouses, migratory divorce could be attained in
other jurisdictions. Id. In addition to migratory divorces in Nevada or Mexico, another
method of evading New York divorce law was through annulment. See generaly Jacob,
supra note 2, at 35. There were also fewer stigmas attached to a marriage that was not
consummated. Id. As a result, New York had the highest annulment rate in nation, with
about one-third of all reported annulments in the nation. Id.
23 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(4) (Consol. 2000) (expanding definition of adultery
to include deviant sexual intercourse); see also Freed & Brandes supra note 1, at 3
(discussing New York matrimonial law and grounds for divorce).
24 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-5.
Under prior New York statute, persons who were found to have committed adultery that
resulted in divorce decree were not permitted to remarry during the plaintiffs lifetime
without court permission. Id. It was assumed that such persons were deemed unfit to
marry. Id.
25 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (Consol. 2000) (codifying adultery as Class B
misdemeanor).
26 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(AX1) (West 2001) (providing that "the court may
direct either spouse to provide suitably for the support of the other..."); [1 Matrimonial
Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-5; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§236 practice cmt. (McKinney 1999) (Alan D. Scheinkman) (stating before enactment of §
236(A)(1), adultery would automatically bar "women" from receiving alimony).
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awards in extremely egregious cases. 27
When the adultery ground is litigated, the proceeding may
become extremely acrimonious, especially when an accusatory
spouse sets out to humiliate or embarrass with evidence from
detectives, witnesses and photographs. 28 While litigating
adultery may afford the plaintiff spouse an upper hand in
negotiations, 29 adultery is the most difficult ground to succeed
upon because of arcane statutory defenses and arduous
evidentiary requirements. 30
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the inclination and the
intent to commit adultery as well as opportunity. 3 1 Vague
testimony as to identification of parties or dates, or incomplete
testimony that does not lead to a strong inference of adultery is
insufficient. 32 Moreover, where the defendant can make a
showing that frequent association with the correspondent was for
proper and non-incriminating purposes, the divorce will be
dismissed. 33 In cases where it is alleged that defendant is living
under the same roof in an adulterous relationship, a strict degree
of additional evidence is necessary. 34 Such a living arrangement
alone is not sufficient proof of adultery, as it goes to the element
of opportunity and not to inclination or intent. 35
27 The present provision states that fault is not a factor in equitable distribution.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §236(B). However, where the court deems that the fault is
egregious, the court can find authority in § 236(B)(6)(a)(11) that states, "any other factor
which the court shall expressly fird to be just and proper." Id. Using this open-ended
provision, the court can then reduce spousal maintenance for the adultery. Id.
28 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-6; see
also WEITZMAN, supranote 2, at 8-10.
29 See Weitzman, supra note 2, at 9-10 (quoting divorce lawyer Raoul Felder's
explanation of use of scandal to get vulnerable executive to settle quickly).
30 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-6.
31 See Graham v. Graham, 157 A.D. 52, 56, 141 N.Y.S. 766, 768 (App. Div. 1913)
(noting that what appears to be improper may be innocent and allegations may be suspect
when plaintiff tries to obtain divorce for reasons of his own adultery); [1 Matrimonial
Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE supra note 22, at 18-21.
32 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CrvIL PRACTICE supra note 22, at 18-27.
33 See Conger v. Conger, 82 N.Y. 603, 603 (1880) (noting that "frequent meetings were
proper and for innocent purposes"); Pollack v. Pollack, 71 N.Y. 137, 153 (1877) (explaining
that where evidence capable of sustaining two interpretations offered, such as when sole
proof tendered is that of opportunity to commit adultery, is not sufficient showing for
adultery charge); Graham 157 A.D. at 58 (accepting defendant's explanation that she was
in barn with correspondent, farmhand, to tend chickens).
34 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-31
(noting "fairly strict degree of proof' is necessary).
35 See Axtell v. Axtell, 119 N.Y.S. 644, 645 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (finding that living under
same roof is only proof of opportunity and not inclination) (dictum); see also McGill v.
McGill, 77 A.D.2d 892, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div. 1980) (agreeing with lower court
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New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules bar the plaintiff
spouse from testifying about the adultery, creating a significant
evidentiary burden. 36 Coupled with this evidentiary burden are
statutory defenses that can result in dismissal of the action due
to plaintiffs conduct. 37 If the plaintiff were also guilty of
adultery, such that a divorce would have been granted to the
defendant, then the defense of recrimination could be raised that
would deny a divorce to the plaintiff.38
The doctrine of
recrimination is based on the premise that a plaintiff who comes
to court with "dirty hands" should not be rewarded. 39 Even if
adultery is proven, divorce may be denied when the innocent
40
spouse has engaged in condonation.
Condonation, the most commonly raised defense, 4 1 occurs when
the plaintiff has forgiven the defendant for the adultery. This is
usually shown by testimony or evidence that the parties, after
the known adulterous conduct, have cohabited and engaged in
sexual relations. 4 2 Another defense involves the plaintiffs
connivance or procurement in the misconduct, where it can be
shown that the plaintiff or the plaintiffs agents actually caused
that "adultery must be based upon clear and convincing evidence and cannot be based on
"mere suspicion) (Lazer, J., dissenting). But see Westervelt v. Westervelt, 258 N.E.2d 98,
98 (N.Y. 1970) (finding adultery with evidence of living under same roof, social
engagements together and taking contraceptive pills).
36 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4502(a) (Consol. 2000) (stating that "husband or wife is not
competent to testify against the other in an action founded upon adultery, except to prove
the marriage, disprove the adultery, or disprove a defense after evidence has been
introduced tending to prove the defense").
37 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171 (Consol. 2000); [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-77 to 18-78 (noting adultery is only charge in divorce
where there are statutory defenses identical to 1837 law).
38 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171 (Consol. 2000); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 395
N.Y.S.2d 103 (App. Div. 1977) (citing Recht v. Recht, 36 A.D.2d 939, 940, 321 N.Y.S.2d
395 (App. Div. 1971) (finding mutual recrimination bars divorce based on adultery)).
39 SeeWEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 10-11.
40 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171(3) (Consol. 2000).
41 See Weitzman, supra note 2, at 10 (describing California's no-fault divorce law).
See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1987) (outlining defenses to divorce);
Reva B. Seigel, The Modernization of MaritalStatus Law: Adjudicating Wives'Rights to
Earnings,1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2189 (1994) (discussing right of condonation).
42 See Figurka v. Figurka, 230 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1962) (holding that husband's
condonation was evinced from cohabiting in close proximity with wife after knowledge of
her adultery); Brown v. Brown, 21 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940) (stating as
axiomatic that resumption of marital relationship after adulterous breach is condonation
barring divorce). See generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault:
Legislative and JudicialExperiments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 7 (1997)
(describing parameters of condonation defense).
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or committed the adultery.43 Additionally the action could be
barred by the five-year statute of limitations.44 Because of the
acrimonious nature of an adultery proceedings and the legal
difficulties posed by the defenses and evidentiary burdens, often
times multiple grounds are pled, in conjunction with an adultery
charge.45
2. The Ground of Cruel and Inhuman Treatment
Under New York Domestic Relation Law § 170 (1), a divorce
will be granted where the defendant's conduct is found to have
adverse consequences on the plaintiff.46 The plaintiff must prove

that the other spouse's conduct "so endangers the physical or
mental well being of the plaintiff so as to render it unsafe or
improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant."47 This
definition and what rises to the level of cruel and inhuman
treatment has been the subject of much judicial controversy. 48 In
order to maintain the action, the plaintiff in a long-term
marriage must show serious misconduct and not mere
incompatibility.49 Moreover, a high degree of proof is required to
show that there is actionable cruelty, usually corroboration by
medical experts or third parties, 50 especially in the case of a long43 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 171(1) (Consol. 2000); Beauley v. Beauley, 190 N.Y.S.
129, 130-31 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (explaining that divorce decree must be set aside when
procured by deceit); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 92 N.Y.S. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (denying
divorce because of plaintiff s connivance and procurement of adultery).
44 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 210 (Consol. 2000).
45 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 18-6.
46 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (Consol. 2000); see also Herbert Jacob, supranote
2, at 1130 (1988) (noting that New York did not amend its divorce law before Civil War to
include this ground as most other states had done).
47 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1).
48 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 1641.
49 See Brady v. Brady, 476 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1985) (reiterating Hessen rule requiring
proof of cruel and inhuman treatment to establish repeated conduct that makes
cohabitation unsafe or improper, noting that irreconcilable or irremediable differences is
insufficient); Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1974) (distinguishing cruel and
inhuman treatment from mere incompatibility, which is not ground for divorce); see also
Murphy v. Murphy, 683 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1999) (finding allegations of
spouse's frequent absence, verbal abuse and two altercations without physical injury
insufficient to show course of conduct of cruelty in 26 year marriage); Biegeleisen v.
Biegeleisen, 676 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App. Div. 1998) (finding strained, tense and
unpleasant relationship after 20 year marriage did not establish harmful effects on wife).
See generally, Joel R. Brandes, 'Hessen' Revisited - The Cruelty Ground for Divorce,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 2000, at 3 (discussing cases that shed light on cruelty ground for
divorce).
50 See Marciano v. Marciano, 555 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 1990) (reversing grant of
divorce where no medical proof for causation provided for condition); Green v. Green, 513

2002]

NEWYORKS FA ULT-BASED DIVORCE

term marriage.5 1 Insufficient evidence can lead to dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action. 52 In a long term marriage,
discord and friction between the spouses is often not enough to
sustain a divorce, 53 unless physical abuse is involved. 54 The
amount of physical abuse necessary to obtain a divorce is not
clearly defined.55 An isolated act of violence may or may not be
N.Y.S.2d 49, 49 (App. Div. 1987) (finding error in granting divorce where no medical
evidence showed wife's health was affected by misconduct). Cf Wilbourne v. Wilbourne,
569 N.Y.S.2d 680, 680 (App. Div. 1991) (finding corroboration for wife's constant
accusations of infidelity as basis for impropriety for continued cohabitation); McKilligan
v. McKilligan, 550 N.Y.S.2d 121, 121 (App. Div. 1989) (finding cruelty that impaired
spouse using corroboration of family, medical experts and third parties).
51 See Brady, 64 N.Y.2d at 345 (reaffirming Hessen, holding whether plaintiff has
cause of action for cruelty divorce will depend, in part, on duration of marriage in issue);
Doyle v. Doyle, 625 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that lack of objective proof
that defendant's misconduct adversely affected plaintiffs health was ground for reversing
divorce decree); [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CML Practice, supra note 22, at 1540; see also Wilkins v. Wilkins, 458 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div. 1982) (stating that high
degree of proof is required to terminate marriage of relatively long duration on grounds of
cruel and inhuman treatment).
S2 See Waterman v. Waterman, 490 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (dismissing
action for failure to state cause of action where cruel and inhuman treatment was alleged
by defendant's silent treatment, name calling and slight physical contact); see also
Wilkins, 91 A.D.2d at 771 (noting failure to converse or communicate does not rise to level
of cause of action for divorce on ground of cruel and inhuman treatment); Concetto v.
Concetto, 377 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (App. Div. 1975) (stating that name-calling and two
isolated acts of alleged violence failed to suffice for finding cruel and inhuman treatment).
Cf Echevarria v. Echevarria, 353 N.E.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that even one
beating constitutes more than single act of violence when it is composed of repeated and
prolonged acts of physical abuse); Bulger, 88 A.D.2d at 895 (noting plaintiff need not
establish actual physical injury at hands of defendant or specific number of instances of
physical abuse and that pattern of conduct including verbal abuse and physical
harassment is sufficient).
53 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 15-19 to
15-21 (citing case of Jacoby v. Jacoby, which denied divorce in 25 year marriage where
violent verbal attacks occurred but no unprovoked physical injury); see also Hessen, 33
N.Y.2d at 410 (stating that marital misconduct must be distinguished from mere
incompatibility to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment); Buckley v. Buckley, 461
N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (App. Div. 1983) (noting inordinate weight gain and high blood
pressure do not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment); Denny v. Denny, 409 N.Y.S.2d
443, 444 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that Domestic Relations Law does not authorize
granting divorce based on irreconcilable differences or incompatibility), afTd, 48 N.Y.2d
915 (1979). But see Wilbourne v. Wilbourne, 569 N.Y.S.2d 680, 680 (App. Div. 1991)
(finding scratching and hair-pulling as marital discord that went beyond incompatibility
or strained relations).
54 See Zack v. Zack, 590 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (App. Div. 1992) (finding actionable cruelty
in pattern of abusive acts, including causing wife's nipples to bleed, smashing her hand in
a kitchen drawer and punching her in head); Frigano v. Frigano, 339 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (granting divorce where husband struck or choked wife on at least four
occasions). But see Johnson v. Johnson, 351 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 1974) (holding
that single act of violence is not sufficient to warrant divorce for cruel and inhuman
treatment).
55 See [Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 15-25; see
also Concetto, 50 A-D.2d at 883 (stating that name-calling and two isolated acts of alleged
violence failed to suffice for finding of cruel and inhuman treatment); Mante v. Mante, 34
A.D.2d 134, 136, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944, 947 (App. Div. 1970) (noting that cruel and inhuman
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held sufficient to grant a divorce.5 6 In a short marriage, lasting
four years or less, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
two beatings did not constitute "mere incompatibility," and
stated that a single beating could constitute more than "a single
act of violence when it is composed of repeated and prolonged
acts of physical abuse." 57 On the other hand, an isolated violent
act coupled with other misconduct may be considered sufficient.5 8
Adulterous conduct, especially if open and notorious, may also be
accepted as proof of cruel and inhuman treatment.5 9 Thus, one
commentator has noted that "the action is fraught with
speculation as to the type of conduct which can be held sufficient
to grant affirmative relief."60
While the degree of proof is a serious obstacle to obtaining a
treatment is an ad-hoc determination).
56 See Matthews v. Matthews, 238 A.D.2d 926, 926, 661 N.Y.S.2d 115, 115 (App. Div.
1997) (holding absence of cruel and inhuman treatment in case of one incident of physical
abuse in fourteen year marriage); Wenderlich v. Wenderlich, 311 N.Y.S.2d 797, 797
(App.Div.1970) (finding wife not entitled to divorce as result of husband striking her
once); Schapiro v. Schapiro, 276 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (App. Div. 1967) (holding absence of
cruel and inhuman treatment in case of two isolated incidents of physical abuse). See
generally [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 15-25
(noting change in law in 1966 deeming single act of violence insufficient to establish cruel
and inhuman treatment overruled preceding well-settled rule).
57 See Echevarria, 353 N.E.2d at 566 (stating that one beating constitutes more than
single act of violence when it is composed of repeated and prolonged acts of physical
abuse); see also Bulger v. Bulger, 450 N.Y.S.2d 601, 601 (App. Div. 1982) (noting that
plaintiff need not establish actual physical injury at hands of defendant, but that pattern
verbal abuse and physical harassment is sufficient); Barnier v. Barnier, 349 N.Y.S.2d 113,
113 (App. Div. 1973) (holding that humiliation, denying sexual attention, and neglect are
sufficient to sustain action for divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment).
58 See Echevarria,40 N.Y.2d at 264 (stating that even one beating constitutes more
than single act of violence when it is composed of repeated and prolonged acts of physical
abuse); Johnson v. Johnson, 325 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1975) (upholding, without explanation,
granting of divorce for husband's single violent act coupled with pattern of bickering and
harassment); see also Weilert v. Weilert, 495 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. Div. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 562 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1990) (finding ample cruelty where husband
verbally abused wife for two years and struck her and child once while intoxicated). Cf
Wenderich, 34 A.D.2d at 727 (finding wife not entitled to divorce as result of husband
striking her once).
59 See Grubman v. Grubman, 548 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (App. Div. 1989) (finding each
spouse had established prima facie case for cruel and inhuman conduct). Cf Silverman v.
Silverman, 632 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (stating that claim of adultery is
fundamentally different in character from claim of cruelty). See generally Christian v.
Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 853 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing that under Divorce Reform Law of
1966, adultery is one of many factors that may constitute cruel and inhuman treatment in
New York courts). Cf Silverman v. Silverman, 632 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(stating that claim of adultery is fundamentally different in character from claim of
cruelty).
60 [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 16-06. See
generally id. at 16.04 (discussing variations of conduct in divorce and separation
situations); Id. at 18.09 to 18-13 (discussing how statute of limitations on adulterous
conduct will vary, affecting relief sought).
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divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment, especially for a longterm marriage, the divorce may also be thwarted by the defense
of provocation. 6 1 Following the "clean hands" doctrine, the court
62
requires that the party seeking the divorce be blameless.
Another defense may be raised when the "innocent" spouse has
continued cohabitation following acts of cruelty, 63 following a
rationale similar to that of the condonation defense for
64
adultery.
3. The Ground of Abandonment
Although a ground for separation since 1813, abandonment
was added as a ground for divorce in 1966.65 Abandonment is
generally defined as (1) willful and voluntary leaving of the
marital home, (2) without justification and (3) with the intention
of never returning.6 6 A waiting period of one year before
commencement of the divorce action is required.6 7
If there is consent from the other or an agreement to separate,
by definition there is no abandonment. 68 The abandonment must
61 See Melnick v. Melnick, 538 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (App. Div. 1989) (upholding jury
denial of divorce for wife's misconduct of throwing objects and garbage at husband
because husband provoked wife by telling her he was dating another woman).
62 See Mante v. Mante, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944, 949-950 (App. Div. 1970) (stating although
wife was entitled to divorce on basis of cruel and inhuman treatment, her misconduct of
abandonment caused forfeiture of her right to divorce); see also Rect v. Rect, 321 N.Y.S.2d
395, 396 (App. Div. 1971) (denying divorce to either party due to guilty activities by both
parties); Defeo v. Defeo, 605 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (finding that plaintiff was
blameless when wife's conduct constituted abandonment and justified divorce);
WErZMAN, supra note 2, at 11 (focusing that factors of fault and guilt are not required in
determining California no-fault divorce).
63 See Warguleski v. Warguleski, 435 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (App. Div. 1981) (denying
divorce where acts complained were followed by cohabitation); see also Brady v. Brady,
101 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that cohabitation factors into divorce
analysis), affd 64 N.Y.2d 339 (1985).
64 See WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing defenses for divorce and adultery).
See generally Bracksmayer v. Bracksmayer, 22 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(defining cohabitation and discussing condonation in divorce context).
65 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(2) (Consol. 2000); Joint Legislative Comm. On
Matrimonial and Family Law, No. 8, at 87 (N.Y. 1966).
66 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170 (Consol. 2000) (adopting wording from Wi'ams v.
Wiliams, 29 N.E. 98, 98 (N.Y. 1891) (defining abandonment in separation action); see
also Hage v. Hage, 492 N.Y.S.2d 172, 175 (App. Div. 1985) (requiring that abandoned
spouse be firmly resolved not to live with other spouse and not to fulfill marital
obligations for at least one year, with such conduct being unjustified and without consent
of abandoned spouse); Harmen v. Harmen, 209 N.Y.S.2d 568, 569-70 (App. Div. 1961)
to establish willful
(requiring that action for abandonment state sufficient facts
abandonment, that defendant left with intention not to return, and that times and places
of acts of abandonment be specified).
67 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (Consol. 2000).
68 See Belandres v. Belandres, 395 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (App. Div. 1977) (holding award
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be willful and voluntary.6 9 The essential element of permanence
of the abandonment is a fact specific determination, requiring the
court to carefully scrutinize the circumstances and conduct of the
parties. 70 For the abandonment ground to succeed, there must be
no justification for the permanent leave-taking.71 This
requirement is a vestigial remnant from New York's action for
separation, and is based on the same legislative concerns that the
wife will employ the abandonment action as an extortion tactic. 72
Although specifically formulated for this select set of facts, the
rule remains, and the finding of misconduct by the plaintiff or
justification for the departure will bar a divorce. 73
Where physical violence is a justification for the abandonment,
the burden required is not as stringent as those required for
of dual divorce on mutual abandonment ground improper); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum,
288 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (stating that court ordered separation does not
constitute abandonment).
69 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170(2) (Consol. 2000) (stating that action for divorce
may be maintained on grounds of abandonment of plaintiff by defendant for period of one
or more years); see also Harmen, 12 A.D.2d at 784 (stating action for separation based on
abandonment complaint must state facts sufficient to establish that abandonment was
willful with no intention of returning).
70 See Mirizio v Mirizio, 161 N.E. 461, 462 (N.Y. 1928) (refusing to create formula to
establish permanent abandonment, although recognizing time is often most significant
factor); see also In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 64 (N.Y. 1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)
(stating that parties must abide by technical requirements of proof if seeking to obtain
divorce based upon abandonment); Graves v. Graves, 675 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (Sup. Ct.
1998) (holding no cause of action for divorce based upon husband's abandonment of wife
where order of protection has removed him from marital home).
71 See Pike v. Pike, 19 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (finding justification because
of wife's assaults on husband).
72 The
Joint Committee retained the no-justification requirement despite
dissatisfactions with it so as to preclude a wife from "perversely" using the abandonment
action in an attempt to hamstring the husband-defendant who has sought a migratory
divorce. See Joint Legislative Comm. On Matrimonial and Family Law, No. 8, at 96 (N.Y.
1966).The plaintiffs burden to prove that the leave-taking was unjustified was left as
protection for the husband who otherwise would have been prey to what the legislature
viewed as extortion by the wife:
The wife then, in effect, extorts ransom from the husband in the form of a property
settlement or excessive alimony before she consents to the arrangement of a migratory
divorce. It has been forcefully argued that Section 202at least offers the husband a
practical defense which would often discourage avaricious wives from undertaking such
perversions of the separation action. For this reason, the Committee, with some
reluctance proposes retention of Section 202 for the present .... Id
73 See Johnson v. Johnson, 561 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1018 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that
husband's claim of abandonment was invalid as plaintiff-husband had been in prison
during period of abandonment); Walden v. Walden, 41 A.D.2d 664, 664, 340 N.Y.S.2d 709,
709 (App. Div. 1973) (firding it was error to preclude evidence of adultery as defense to
abandonment). See generally Lisa E. Martin, ProvidingEqualJustice for the Domestic
Violence Victim: Due Process and the Victim's Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 329,
346 (1999) (noting that any misconduct by plaintiff may not only render divorce
proceedings more difficult, but may also bar custody rights as well).
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maintaining a charge of cruel and inhuman treatment.7 4 Thus, it
appears easier to justify abandonment caused by violence, which
would bar the grant of a divorce, than it would be to grant a
75
divorce based on cruel and inhuman treatment.
In 1960 the Court of Appeals enlarged the ground of
abandonment in Diemer v. Dermer76 by finding the unjustified
refusal of a spouse to have conjugal relations for one year gave
rise to a cause of action in abandonment. 77 This enlargement
however, did not open the "floodgates to actions" in abandonment
as feared. 78 The courts require that sexual abandonment be
"unjustified, willful and continued" and that the allegedly
abandoned spouse repeatedly request the other spouse for
cohabitation. 79 The courts have not granted divorce for
abandonment where it was shown that the abandonment was
due to misconduct by the other spouse. 80 The courts, moreover,
have required that the evidence of unjustified refusal be
specific. 8 ' Additionally, a divorce based on lack of conjugal
74 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIvIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 1641
(discussing the difficulty for proving cruel and inhuman treatment in divorce
proceedings).
75 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YoRK CIvIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 16-41.
76 8 N.Y.2d at 206 (1960).
77 See id.; see also Silver v. Silver, 253 A.D.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(granting divorce to husband after showing of willful and unjustified refusals by wife to
have sex for one year period).
78 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 16-36
(noting that while divorce for abandonment was not available in 1966, statute did allow
for separation action on same ground and divorce action became patterned on earlier
cases for separation).
79 See Biegeleisen v. Biegeleisen, 676 N.Y.S.2d 684, 695 (App. Div. 1998) (denying
divorce as there was no showing of repeated requests for sexual relations); Lyons v.
Lyons, 589 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (App. Div. 1992 ) (requiring abandoning spouse to
unjustifiably refuse to have sex for at least one year); Caprise v. Caprise, 533 N.Y.S.2d
622, 624 (App. Div. 1988) (requiring repeated requests for sexual relations by abandoned
spouse for proof of abandonment); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 449 N.Y.S.2d 4, 4 (App. Div.
1982) (upholding dismissal of action where request for sex was made only once in seven
years); Rossiter v. Rossiter, 399 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (Sup Ct. 1977) (finding failure to have
conjugal relations insufficient to sustain cause of action without unjustified refusal); [1
Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CrViL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 16-36 (noting that
courts have strictly enforced requirement that refusal must be unjustified).
80 See Schine v. Schine, 286 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1972) (stating that abandonment
must be unjustified and without consent of other spouse); see also Passantino v.
Passantino, 450 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (App. Div. 1982) (denying husband's divorce action based
on sexual abandonment due to husband's extra-marital relations). See generallyLyons v
Lyons, 589 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (App. Div. 1992) (stating that in order to establish
constructive abandonment, spouse must prove that abandoning spouse unjustifiably
refused to fulfill basic obligations arising from marriage contract for at least one year).
81 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(2) (Consol. 2000) (stating action for divorce may be
procured for abandonment for at least one year); Schine, 31 N.Y.2d at 119 (stating
abandonment must be unjustified and without consent).
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relations will not be granted where the plaintiff spouse has
acquiesced to a sexless marriage because there has been no act of
abandonment.82
B. Domestic RelationsLaw Section 170 May Result in
PermanentBar to an InterstateDivorce
The stringency of both the proofs required for the elements of
each ground for divorce and the ease with which defenses can
defeat these grounds make it difficult, and in some cases
impossible, to overcome the fault requirement in a contested
divorce. 83 Therefore, it is entirely possible that a New York
citizen wishing to dissolve a marriage may never be able to
obtain a divorce from the contesting spouse 4 so long as the
contesting spouse remains fixed in opposing the divorce and so
long as the plaintiff remains a citizen of New York.
As a result of the State's refusal to alter the marital status of
the parties, the plaintiff, unable to obtain a divorce, is thereby
forced into a dilemma.8 5 Due to the bigamy laws, 86 he or she is
barred from entering a new marriage and as a result may
82 SeeFrances G. v. Vincent G., 525 N.E.2d 739, 740 (N.Y. 1988); Schine, 31 N.Y.2d at
119 (inferring that sexless marriage is not constructive abandonment if consensual);
Solomen v. Solomen, 49 N.E.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. 1943) (stating that consensual repudiations
of marital obligations is not abandonment unless there is good faith renewal of marital
obligations).
83 See, e.g., Beigeleisen v. Beigeleisen, 676 N.Y.S.2d 684, 684 (stating wife seeking
divorce under "cruel and inhuman treatment" failed to show serious misconduct and
therefore failed to procure divorce); Wenderlich v. Wenderlich, 311 N.Y.S.2d 797, 797
(App. Div. 1970) (stating that striking plaintiff was insufficient to establish cruel and
inhuman treatment); McGill v. McGill, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1016 (App. Div. 1980) (stating
adultery must be proven through clear and convincing evidence, where living and
vacationing together is insufficient to prove adultery).
84 See e.g., Zweig v. Zweig, 580 A.2d 939, 941 (Vt. 1990) (stating that divorce action
would not be barred due to prior divorce proceeding in sister state if subsequent action is
based on events subsequent to prior action). Compare Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40,
43-44 (Fla. 1952) (following jurisdictions that hold subsequent divorce action in sister
state will not be barred regarding same facts if different cause of action asserted), with
Ball v. Ball, 76 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ark. 1934) (stating that final decree in divorce action in
sister state should apply as bar to subsequent action as to all causes of action which could
have arisen from same facts and circumstances).""
85 See generallyN.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 170, 170-a, 171 to 173, 175 (Consol. 2001)
(codifying actions for divorce); Herbert Jacob, supra note 2, at 1104 (enunciating three
reasons for divorce law reform); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 91-97 (1991) (stating four reasons for impetus in
divorce law reform).
86 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.15 (Consol. 2000) (codifying law against bigamy). See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1 (West 2000) (New Jersey's law against bigamy); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-6-1 (2001) (Rhode Island's law against bigamy).
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abandon the contesting spouse or commit adultery. 87 This result
is the very misconduct deemed culpable by the law, yet for which
88
the law offers no remedy when there is a contesting spouse.
Furthermore, where abandonment does not result, the law
creates a situation fraught with the danger of domestic violence,
where the antagonistic spouses, pitted against one another in an
adversarial proceeding, continue to cohabitate. 89
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO
MARRY AND THE CONCOMITANT RIGHT TO DIVORCE
A. MartalStatus as Subsumed by PersonalAutonomy and the
Right to Privacy
The right to marry has been associated with the Constitution's
broad grant of personal autonomy for which there is a grant of
presumptive immunity from governmental regulation. 90 Justice
Harlan first articulated this concept in the United States
Supreme Court in 1961 in the dissent in Poe v. UI!man,9 1 where
he recognized the right of citizens to be free of arbitrary
government intrusion in their private affairs. 92 A precursor of
87 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6 (Consol. 2000) (providing that marriage between
previously married persons are void unless dissolved or annulled); see also Cave v. Cave,
137 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (App. Div. 1955) (stating that marriage is void if contracted by
person whose spouse is living, unless previous marriage has been annulled or dissolved);
Stein v. Dunne, 103 N.Y.S. 894 (App. Div. 1907) (stating that second marriage is void
where first marriage has not been dissolved or annulled even with absence of judicial
decree), affirmed 190 N.Y. 524, (1907). See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (Consol.
2000) (codifying criminal act of bigamy).
88 See Cave, 285 A.D. at 450; see also suprain. 1-10 & accompanying text.
89 See Marther Heller, Note, Should Breaking Up Be Harder To Do" The
Ramifications a Return to Fault-BasedDivorce Would Have Upon Domestic Violence, 4
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 263, 266-68 (1996) (arguing that return to fault basis would
adversely affect abused women). See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women RedeFining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1991)
(discussing patterns of abuse for women who attempt to separate from their spouses and
significant others). But cf Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 879, 890-91 (1994) (stating that states where nofault divorce is available do not necessarily have lower instances of domestic violence).
90 See generally Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in
the Constitution, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 447 (1983) (discussing origins of right to
personal autonomy); Louis Henkin, Pivacy andAutonomy, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 1410, 1419
(1974) (discussing synthesis of constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy); Paul M.
Adkins, Note, Omipotent orImpotent? The Curator'sRole in SeparationandDivorce, 43
LA. L. REV. 1019, 1023-29 (1983) (discussing Constitutional right to marry).
91 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
92 See id., at 535-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing view that marital privacy was
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the Harlan articulation was the 1942 Supreme Court ruling in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,93 where the Court recognized the basic
rights of marriage and procreation and found the state's
sterilization of a criminal population a violation of the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 94 In Loving
v. Virginia,95 the Court held that a state miscegenation statute
was unconstitutional, noting that "the freedom to marry has been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."96
1. The Right to Marry
It was the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,97 which
firmly established the the right to marital privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment,9 8 through the resurrection of the
doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 99 where the rights of a
married couple in matters of procreation and family were
protected from impermissible state encroachments.1 0 0 Eisenstadt
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment liberty and that intrusion of personal privacy by
state required careful scrutiny). See generallyOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing every man, as against government, has
right to be let alone); Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (recognizing
rights of parents to be free from arbitrary intrusions by government in child rearing).
93 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
94 See id., at 541-43 (recognizing marriage as fundamental to human existence and
survival). See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasizing
recognition by Fourteenth Amendment of right to marry).
95 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
96 See id., at 12 (recognizing freedom to marry as constitutionally protected right,
essential to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness).
97 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98 See id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (recognizing Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from abridging personal liberties not listed in first eight amendments);
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited
to protection of rights listed in Constitution); Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring) (noting
anti-use statute invades protected area of privacy).
See generally Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (recognizing freedom of personal choice is protected
by Due Process clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Lawton, supra note 87, at 2481-88
(discussing origins of Constitutional right to marry).
99 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-84 (distinguishing Lochner era use of doctrine to
support freedom to contract from this new use of substantive due process for privacy). See
generallyMoore, 431 U.S. at 499 (recognizing that freedom of choice in area of marriage is
protected by Due Process Clause); Developments, the Constitution of the Family, supra
note 16, at 1161-97 (discussing fundamental right to autonomy in areas of marriage);
Lawton, supra note 87, at 2481-88 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment as origin to
Constitutional right to marry).
100 See Griswold,381 U.S. at 486 (affording heightened judicial protection from state
interference for marital privacy); see also Developments, the Constitution of the Family,
supra note 16, at 1161-87 (outlining Court's progressive adoption of substantive due
process to protect fundamental rights, using procreative rights as illustration). See
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1 , extended the privacy right enunciated for married
v. Baird
couples in Griswoldto that of the individual.10 2 The monumental
decision of Roe v. Wade'0 3 rendering state prohibition against
abortion unconstitutional,10 4 was a natural consequence of the
premise of procreative autonomy set down in the seminal
decisions of Griswold and Eisenstadt'0 5 The Supreme Court
jurisprudence protective of individual's right to autonomy and
personal freedom was forged by the trilogy- of Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Roe,10 6- and gave rise to the jurisprudence of
decisional autonomy that accorded the individual the right to be
free of state intrusion in matters affecting personal and family

choices. 107
In Zablocki v. Redhail,o8 decided in 1978, the Supreme Court
aggressively enlarged the scope of privacy rights to include an
generally Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937) (asserting Constitutional
protection of fundamental rights from government encroachment).
101 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
102 See id at 453-54 (proclaiming that right of procreative autonomy defined in
Griswold was right of individual, whether married or not); Developments, The
Constitution of the Family, supra note 16, at 1184-85 (discussing how Eisenstadtdecision
goes beyond Griswold rationale); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing that Constitutional protection of personal
decisions extends to individuals).
103 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104 See id, (rendering state prohibition against abortion illegal).
105 See Developments, The Constitution of the Family,supra note 16, at 1185 (stating
that inquiry in Roe v. Wade naturally followed established right of procreative autonomy);
see also David B. Cruz, 'The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 311 (2000) (stating
that right of procreative autonomy was extended to abortion in Roe v. Wade); Martin
Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in a
ConstitutionalDemocracy A ConstitutionalistApproach to the Encyclical Evangelium
Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 157 (1998) (suggesting that Roe v. Wade outcome is related to
Eisenstadt and Griswold).
106 See Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt" Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform
Proposals, CulturalStereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 621-22
(1999) (analyzing impact of these three cases on protection of individual rights); see also
Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 357 (1997) (noting these cases as responsible for
See generally
judicial acceptance of individuality and choice in family matters).
Developments, The Constitution of the Family, supra note16, at 1161-97 (discussing
sources of Constitutional protection for family rights).
107 See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (stating "the decision
that an individual may make without unjustified governmental interference are personal
decisions 'relating to marriage...."' (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973))). See
generally Biondi, supra note 104, at 621-22 (discussing individual rights argument in
support of fault-based divorce). But see David D. Meyer, The ParadoxofFamily Privacy,
53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 536 (2000) (questioning aggressive posture of Court in cases
involving state intrusion upon family rights).
108 434 U.S. 374 (1978).

STJOHAPSJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 16:165

individual's right to marry.109 Zablocki struck down as
unconstitutional a Wisconsin law that prior to obtaining a
marriage license, permission from the state was needed based on
a showing that prior support obligations were complied with and
proof that his premarital children would not become public
charges.I 0
The Court affirmed the right to marry as
fundamental, and stated that the Court had "routinely
categorized the decision to marry as among the personal
decisions protected by the right of privacy."lll Moreover, the state
law was deemed a "serious intrusion" on the right to marry as
some were "absolutely prevented from getting married" by the
law, while others were effectively "coerced into forgoing their
2
right to marry."'"
Turner v. Safleyi 13 solidified the Zablocki court's designation of
Constitutional status to the right to marry"14 and held that
Zablocki applied to prison inmates. 115 Under Missouri law,
marriage between prison inmates was almost completely
prohibited." 6 As the regulation was not reasonably related to
109 See id. (holding that statute violated Equal Protection Clause by interfering with
exercise of fundamental right to marry).
110 See id. at 386. See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (noting
close consideration Court gives to important family issues); Meyer, supra note 107, at 532
(stating that current Constitutional protection for family privacy includes right to marry)
11I See Zablock, 434 U.S. at 387; Dolgin, supra note 106, at 357 (noting U.S. Supreme
Court cases responsible for judicial acceptance of individuality and choice in family
matters); Jana B. Singer, The PrivatizationofFamilyLaw, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 151011 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court's changing treatment of marriage).
112 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; see also Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and the
Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 399 (2000) (stating that privacy protects right to
marry); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and The ConstitutionalRight To Marry, 17901990, 41 HOw. L.J. 289, 339 (1998) (stating that right to marry is critical component of
privacy).
113 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
114 See id, at 95 (stating that prison inmates "retains those [Constitutional] rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system..."); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387; Id. at 375 n.1
(providing pertinent parts of Wisconsin statute which failed to recognize foreign
marriages for which state permission was not sought, invalidated marriages not in
statutory compliance and criminally penalized non-compliance). See generallyWIS. STAT.
§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1999).
115 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 78 (1987) (holding that Missouri prison restrictions on
inmate correspondence violated Constitutional right to marry).
116 Id.; see also Maltz, supra note 16, at 951 (stating Turner further enhanced
Constitutional status of right to marry); Mark C. Rahdert, Same Sex Relationships:A
Constitutional Commentary, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 495, 501 (1998) (noting
Turner followed and built on Zablocki in upholding prisoners' Constitutional right to
marry); Jennifer Wriggins, Maine's Act to Protect TraditionalMarriage and Prohibit
Same-Sex Marriages: Questions of Constitutionality Under State and FederalLaw, 50
ME. L. REv. 345, 360 (1998) (noting Loving v. Virinia, Zablocki and Turner established
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penological interests and the fundamental right to marry was
impermissibly burdened, the court struck the law down as
17
unconstitutional.
2. The Right to Divorce
As Zablocki and Turner make it improper for state law to
unduly burden the fundamental right to marry, it appears logical
to extend this Constitutional dictate to a state divorce law, such
as New York's, that also unduly burdens the right to marry by
making divorce decrees unattainable in a contested divorce under
many circumstances. 118
In Boddie v. Connecticut,119 the Supreme Court noted how
singularly important the judicial system is in regard to martial
relations: "Without prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may
freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for example,
but we unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may
covenant to dissolve marriages without state approval."' 20 In
Boddie, an indigent was barred from getting a divorce because he
could not pay the filing fees.121 The Court found state denial of
access a violation of due process rights and struck down the
statute.1 2 2 Because of the importance of marriage in our society,
the court found that the state monopoly of divorce made it
right to marry as fundamental); Sherri L. Toussaint, Comment, Defense of MarriageAct:
Isn't It Ironic.. .Don't You Think? A Little Too Ironic?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 924, 940 n. 114
(1997) (characterizing Turner as unanimously extending to inmates fundamental right of
marriage established in Zablock).
117 See Turner,482 U.S. at 91.
118 See Bradford, supra note 10, at 623 (arguing eligible status to remarry is valid
corollary to right to marry); Melissa Lawton, Note, The Constitutionalityof Covenant
Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2481 (1998) (stating that right to marry
includes right to divorce because of similarity in the voluntary right); Donna J. Zenor,
Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and PatternsofDivorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
649, 652 (1972) (viewing right to end marriage as corollary of right to marry); see also
Cathy J. Jones, The Raghts to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 577, 643 (1985) (arguing divorce should be treated as
fundamental ); Lisa E. Martin, ProvidingEqual Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim:
Due Process and the Victim's Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 329, 338 (1998)
(characterizing right to obtain divorce as "fundamental").
119 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
120 Seeid at 376 (1971).
121 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 373; Mary McCrory Krupnow, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J:
ProtectingFamilialBonds and Creating a New Right of Access in the Civil Courts, 76
N.C. L. REV. 621, 636 (1998) (noting Boddie involved indigents seeking divorce who could
not pay court costs in advance); see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975)
(upholding one year residency requirement to obtain divorce, characterizing Boddids
filing requirement as "total deprivation," not mere delay).
122 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383.
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imperative that access to judicial relief be unimpeded to every
person.123
According to Justice Marshall, the correlative
relationship between the right to divorce and the right to marry,
which has been afforded Constitutional protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, was made explicit in Boddie. "[W]e
recognized that the right to seek dissolution of the martial
relationship was closely related to the right to marry, as both
involve the voluntary adjustment of the same fundamental
human relationship."124
The significance of Boddie's conferral of a Constitutional right
to divorce was illuminated by United States v. Kras,125 where the
plaintiff, a bankruptcy petitioner, sought to follow the precedent
of Boddie, so that the bankruptcy fee provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act would be found unconstitutional. 2 6 The Court
distinguished Kras from Boddie, finding that if the fee barred
Mr. Kras from discharging his bankruptcy, his position would not
be "materially altered in the Constitutional sense." 127 On the
other hand, the access to court denied by the fees to Mr. Boddie
involved his marital interests and the "associational interests
that surround the establishment and dissolution of that
relationship." 28 The Court noted that there have been many
123 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) (stating State must provide access to
judicial processes, like marriage dissolution, without regard to party's ability to pay court
fees); Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Craw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955 (1971) (stating no person can
be denied access to civil courts because of inability to pay a fee); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 37576 (noting due process rights are threatened by state monopoly over divorce).
124 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 420 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also AbdulAkbar v. McKavie, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1281, at *23 (3d. Cir. 2001) (stating right of
judicial access without regard to cost exists for civil cases when denial of judicial forum
would implicate fundamental human interest, including ability to obtain divorce); JOEL E.
NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 801-802 (5th ed. 1995)
(interpreting choice to marry and divorce as fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny
judicial review).
125 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
126 See id., at 434; Standlee v. Arizona, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30594, at *3 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Kras and asserting that bankruptcy "did not rise to the level of a
fundamental right"); Abdul-Akbar, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1281 at *23 (stating
bankruptcy filings are not interests that rise to level of fundamental human interests).
127 See Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-445. C£ Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973)
(holding interest of seeking increased welfare payments does not rise to level of
Constitutional significance as interest of obtaining divorce did in Boddie); Nickens v.
Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 185 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating right to appeal civil damage suit is
not as fundamental as right of marriage).
128 See Kras,409 U.S. at 444; see also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (stating that "[cihoices
about marriage... [are] among associational rights [Supreme Court] has ranked as 'of
basic importance in our society" (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376)); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 385 n.10 (1978) (stating that "[t]he denial of access to the judicial forum in
Boddie touched directly on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that
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decisions in which it recognized the "fundamental importance of
these interests under our Constitution."129 The court in Griswold
specifically found the Fourteenth Amendment protected
associational freedom implicit in the "zone of privacy".130
Furthermore Justice Brennan articulated in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees the Constitutional protection of an individual's
right to associational freedom from state regulation.l31 The Bill
of Rights, designed to protect individual liberty, must offer
"Constitutional shelter" for individuals from unjustified
interference from the state in an individual's associational
choices.1 32 These safeguards are necessary because intimate
relations are crucial, not only as sources of emotional
enrichment, but also as part of the individual's liberty interest
which encompasses the individual's ability to define identity
through associational choices.133
In Sousna v. Iowa,134 another divorce petitioner was barred
from divorce. 135 In that case, the petitioner was barred as a result
of residency requirements, since the petitioner had not resided in
surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship"); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "[miarriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man;
fundamental to our very existence and survival").
129 Kras, 409 U.S. at 444; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 394 (holding Wisconsin state
law denying marriage licenses to residents that were unable to fulfill child support
obligations unconstitutional, as violation of Due Process); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (recognizing freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life in that they are protected by Due Process Clause).
130 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating marriage promotes
socially beneficial consequences); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
684 (1977) (stating decisions relating to marriage are within outer limits of personal
privacy demarked by this court and therefore free from unjustified governmental
interference); LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639 (stating that personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life are of those liberties protected by Due Process Clause).
131 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also Ward v. Athens City Bd. of Educ., 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22766, at *19 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that marriage to spouse was exercise of First
Amendment right to freedom of association); Marcum v. Catron, 70 F.Supp.2d 728, 734
(E.D. Ky. 1999) (stating undue state interference in marital relationships
unconstitutionally infringes upon freedom of association); Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous.
Auth., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21297, at *17 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (stating that "freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977))).
132 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
133 Id. at 619. See generallyKenneth L. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624, 652-66 (1980) (discussing Constitutional doctrinal aspects of
individuals' freedom of intimate association).
134 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
135 See id, at 395 (holding where couple with three children moved from New York to
Iowa and within month wife petitioned Iowa court for divorce, Iowa court lacked
jurisdiction).
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the state for the one-year period required by state law. 136 The
court found the imposition of a time requirement justified in that
it forced those seeking an Iowa divorce to be attached to the state
and thereby prevented the state from becoming a "divorce
mill."

37

The statute also insulated Iowa's divorce decrees from

collateral attack.138 Moreover, the Court distinguished Sosna
from Boddie by the difference in deprivation endured,
characterizing the deprivation in Sosna as a mere delay for the
new resident as opposed to an exclusion for the indigent in
Boddie that would last "forever."' 39
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from
this view, finding that the residency requirement resulted in
"unrecoverable losses."140 When the year has elapsed, it could
136 See id. at 395. The statute which the Court relied upon, IOWA CODE § 598.6
(1973) provided, in pertinent part: "[a] petition for dissolution of marriage.., must state
that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the state... and that the
maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a
marriage dissolution...." Id at 395 n.1. At the time Sosna was decided, such residency
requirements were by no means uncommon, as Iowa was one of forty-eight states to have
one. Id. at 404. In terms of time duration, such requirements ranged from six weeks to
two years. Id. at 405.
137 See id., at 407 (stating power of State to regulate marriage and divorce is near
complete and is only limited by specific Constitutional provisions); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385
(Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that "[tihe State.. .has absolute right to prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created,
and the causes for which it may be dissolved." (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
734-35 (1878))); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (stating "[w]ithin the States of
the Union, the whole subject of the domestic relations... belongs to the laws of the State,
and not to the laws of the United States."); see also Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404 (adhering to
century long jurisprudence and regarded regulation of domestic matters as within
"virtually exclusive province of the [state]."); id., at 406-07 (stating residency
requirements may be reasonably justified on grounds of significant collateral
consequences to State, such as disposition of property and determination of child custody).
138 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 407. The Court held that Iowa had a significant interest in
having its divorce decrees recognized by other states in light of the fact that the judicial
power of a state to grant a divorce has been traditionally found on the domicile of the
petitioner. Id. When a divorce decree is entered after a finding of domicile in an ex parte
proceeding, the Supreme Court has held that the finding of domicile is not binding upon
other States and could be subject to attack. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
229 (1945) Thus, the one year residency requirement in Sosna was viewed as an effective
counter to such collateral antics. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 407. The Court characterized
the residency requirement as "precisely the sort of determination that a state in the
exercise of its domestic relations jurisdiction is entitled to make." Id. at 408-09.
139 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 410. In Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383, the Court voided a statute
that prohibited an indigent from obtaining access to the state's divorce courts. Id. The
Court further reasoned that the statute in Boddie intended to exclude permanently a
certain segment of the population, the poor, from divorce court. Id. at 410. The Court
held that the one year residency requirement did not amount to the total deprivation
imposed on the impoverished petitioner in Boddie. Id.
140 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 421 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "[the majority's]
analysis.. .ignores the severity of the deprivation suffered by the divorce petitioner).
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not be argued that the petitioner was made whole since "the
year's wait prevents remarriage and locks both partners into
what may be an intolerable, destructive relationship. "141
Moreover, Justice Marshall argued that if the state statute in
Boddie had required indigents to wait a year before filing for a
divorce, that the Court still would have struck down the state
law as unconstitutional.142

III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
VIS-A-VIS THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Domestic Relationsis the Exclusive Province of the State
Despite the Constitutional shelter of the Fourteenth
Amendment for the individual's marital rights, both in marriage
and its dissolution, the Supreme Court has long held that
domestic relations is the "virtually exclusive province of the
states."143 Marriage and divorce have been closely regulated by
state legislatures based on an implicit morality.144
Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion in Zablockf, points out that the
State is "the collective expression of moral aspirations" and is
properly interested in seeing that the rules of domestic relations
reflect the values of its people.' 45 Within its borders, each state
141 See id. at 422. Cf Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269
(1974) (voiding Arizona law which conditioned receipt of medical care in non-emergency
cases on one year residency in county); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-48 (1972)
(recognizing injury to unmarried father of being deprived of his child upon death of his
wife, if such child were declared ward of state pursuant to state statute); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969) (voiding statute which conditioned receipt of welfare
payments on one year residency requirement).
142 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 422, n.2; see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383-86 (Douglas, J.
concurring).
143 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-735 (1878) (finding
state has absolute right to establish conditions for marriage and divorce); Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859) (disclaiming federal jurisdiction in divorce); see also
Jonathan Deitrich, The Lessons of the Law: Same Sex Marriageand Baehr v. Lewin, 78
MARQ. L. REv. 121, 125-26 (1994) (discussing States' traditional role in marriage
regulation and impact of Fourteenth Amendment).
144 See Zablocki 434 US at 398 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting marriage and divorce
were originally subject to regulation by ecclesiastical authorities); see also Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888) (affirming that noncompliance of statutory law severs
former wife's right to property); J. Thomas Oldham, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads,80
CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1103 (1992) (discussing counterproductive effect morality plays in
removing "fault" factor in divorce proceedings).
145 See Zablocki, 434 U.S at 399. But see Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking
PowerHierarchies:Sharing the Pieces of JurisdictionalAuthority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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has defined what constitutes the institution of marriage:
proscribing at what age a person can marry, defining the
procedure for marriage, the duties and obligations of the parties,
the property rights of the parties and the grounds for
dissolution. 4 6 State laws have also banned incest, bigamy, and
homosexuality, and required bloods tests as preconditions for
marriage.14 7
B. The ConstitutionalInfirmity ofNew York Divorce Law
While the law of domestic relations is controlled by the state
and wholly within its dominion, the state still must act within
Constitutional limits.1 48 When an individual's protected marital
rights are abridged by the state, "the question is whether the
state interests that support the abridgment can overcome the
substantive protections of the constitution. "149 In this inquiry,
the issue is whether New York divorce law which results in the
permanent deprivation of fundamental marital rights can be
overcome by state interests. 150
1. The 1966 Liberalization as a Safeguard of the New York
Legal System
In 1966,
the legislature liberalized the divorce laws by
enlarging the grounds for divorce to include abandonment
5
and cruel and inhuman treatment. 152
without justification, '1
REV. 385, 394 (2000) (discussing states' use of divorce and marriage regulation as
sociopolitical tools rather than moral regulation).
146 See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 209 (interpreting Oregon Donation Act, 9 Stat. 496
(1850)); see also Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interests in the Marital
Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 15 (2000) (recognizing United States
domestic relations law has traditionally been under state control).
147 See Zablocki; 434 U.S. at 399; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Marriage and the
Intact Family. The SigniicanceofMichaelH. v. GeraldD., 22 WHITrIER L. REV. 327, 328
(2000) (discussing increasing conflict between individual rights and family rights and its
effect on government regulation).
148 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392; see also Melissa Lawton, The Constitutionalityof
CovenantMarriageLaws, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2481 (1998) (discussing uncertainty
in interpreting Constitutional case law concerning right to marry).
149 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391, 392; see also Lawton, supra note 148, at 2481
(discussing uncertainty in interpreting Constitutional case law concerning right to
marry).
150 See. generally E. Todd Wilkowski, The Defense of Marriage Act: Will it be the
Final Word in the Debate over Legal Recognition of Same Sex Unions, 8 REGENT U. L.
REV. 195, 200 (1997) (discussing Zablocki v. Redhail and marriage as a fundamental
right).
151 See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 718 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (2000) (ruling abandonment
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While recognizing that divorce was warranted under these
intolerable circumstances, the 1966 law was also concerned with
the visible fraud that was being perpetrated on the judicial
system.153 With adultery as the sole ground for divorce, the
judiciary was faced with collusion by the parties, in which the
parties agreed to secure a divorce by manufacturing adultery
through perjurious testimony. 154
The liberalization of the divorce laws not only added the "new"
fault grounds, but it also included the ability to obtain a divorce
155
after two years of separation (amended later to one year).
Separation could be obtained under an agreement of separation
or by a judicial decree of separation awarded to a plaintiff for
essentially the same grounds as a divorce.156 The so-called
"conversion divorce," whereby the separation agreement or
separation decree converts to a divorce after one year, has been
said to be the New York equivalent of no-fault divorce 57 because
the conversion divorce does not require fault for the divorce to be
granted.158
The purpose for offering this option was to eliminate two of the
need not be established as ground for divorce).
152 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170(1) (West 2000); Warguleski v. Warguleski, 435
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1981) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (discussing what facts are necessary to
See generally Barnier v. Barnier, 349
establish "cruel and inhuman" treatment).
N.Y.S.2d 113 (discussing spousal abuse).
153 Joint Legislative Comm. On Matrimonial and Family Law, No. 8, at 87 (N.Y.
1966).
154 See In Re Forrester, 155 N.Y.S. 420 (App. Div. 1915) (discussing attorney
misconduct in hiring woman to seduce client's spouse to establish "fault"); Berndt v.
Berndt, 225 N.Y.S. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (discussing false accusations of adultery); Pepin v.
Pepin, 206 N.Y.S. 732 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (discussing legal effect of one spouse condoning
other's adulterous affairs).
155 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §170 (5), (6) (Consol. 2000).
156 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §170(5), (6) (Consol. 2000). See generally Cicerale v
Cicerale, 382 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (invalidating separation agreement due to
improper execution); Martin v Martin, 312 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (granting divorce
where parties to separation agreement have filfilled terms and two years have passed).
157 See Jacobs supra note 2, at 42 (discussing no fault divorces). See generally Ira
Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996)
(discussing rise of no- fault divorce laws); J. Thomas Oldham, PuttingAsunder in the
1990s, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1992) (reviewing DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS,
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) which compiled opinions on whether
no-fault divorce has been fair or in society's best interests).
158 See Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 1970) (stating that "as is
apparent, the legislative design was to render this a basis for divorce, it follows that it
makes no difference whether it is the 'innocent' or 'guilty' party who seeks to convert the
judicial separation into a final divorce"). See generallyShapiro v. Shapiro, 298 N.Y.S.2d
785 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (discussing fault in divorce proceedings); Ullo v. Ullo, 453 N.Y.S.2d
559 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (dealing with fault in divorce proceedings).
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"chief evils" under the prior divorce law: collusive or fraud-ridden
divorce based on fabricated claims and migratory divorce, 159
which werethreatening the integrity of the legal system. 60 The
legislature finally recognized the necessity of divorce in a "dead
marriage," culminating in the creation of the"conversion divorce."
Implicit in the statutory scheme is the legislative recognition
that it is socially and morally undesirableto compel couples to a
dead marriage to retain an illusory and deceptive status and that
the best interests not only of the parties but of society itself will
be furthered by enabling them "to extricate themselves from a
perpetual state of marital limbo."161
Although the conversion divorce was successful in permitting
non-contesting spouses to extricate themselves from each other
and in freeing the judiciary from the visible collusive perjury
rampant under the old law, the Divorce Reform of 1966 was not
as helpful to an individual whose petition for divorce was
contested by the other spouse. 162 While the two new fault
grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and abandonment were
added to the law, the requirements to succeed under theses
grounds were at times insurmountable. 163 There may well be a
159 See Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d at 39 (discussing dangers of false claims in divorce
proceedings). See generallyRappel v. Rappel, 240 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (denying
full faith and credit to Nevada divorce where proponent was continuously domiciled in
New York and had traveled to Nevada specifically for that purpose); Perrin v. Perrin, 250
N.Y.S. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (invalidating Pennsylvania fault based divorce where
proponent's spouse made no appearance nor was personally served).
160 See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 35.
161 Gleason 26 N.Y.2d at 35 (quoting Adelman v. Aldelman, 59 Misc. 2d. 803, 805
(N.Y. 1969)) (emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., Biegeleisen v. Biegeleisen, 676 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App. Div. 1998)
(holding that in action for divorce on ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, proponent
must show serious misconduct, and not mere incompatibility); see also McGill v. McGill,
432 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1016 (App. Div. 1980) (dissenting opinion) (stating that burden for
finding adultery is clear and convincing, and refusal to answer key questions regarding
adulterous affairs by itself may only show a finding of preponderance); Wenderlich v.
Wenderlich, 311 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1970) (finding that being struck once was
inadequate to show cruel and inhuman treatment). See generallySchapiro v. Schapiro,
276 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 1967) (finding husband guilty of cruel and inhuman
treatment).
163 See Joel R. Brandes, 'Hessen'Revisited-The Cruelty Groundfor Divorce, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan 25, 2000, at 3 (reporting conduct constituting cruel and inhuman treatment in Hessen
v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 410 (1974), was upheld in Brady v Brady 64 N.Y.2d 339, 344
(1985)); see, e.g., Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891, 892-93 (N.Y. 1974) (denying husband
divorce despite trial court's finding that "wife had been uncooperative, stubborn, unfair,
unreasonable and irrational in her treatment of the plaintiff'); see also Johnson v.
Johnson, 561 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div. 1990) (finding imprisonment for over fifteen years
does not constitute abandonment because "one of the elements of such a cause of action is
an unjustified separation").
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"dead marriage" in which both parties were engaged in
adultery,164 or where the sexually abandoned spouse could not
succeed because the abandoned spouse has not repeatedly asked
for conjugal relations for one year, 6 5 or where the mistreatment
does not rise to "cruel and inhuman". 66 In addition, New York
divorce law offers no remedy to those spouses who are in a
"perpetual state of marital limbo" as were the parties in
Gleason.167 The statute deems it "morally and socially" proper to
grant a divorce in a "dead marriage," yet installs permanent
obstacles to non-functioning marriages when one spouse contests
the divorce.168 While Gleason articulates a non-fault ethic,
stating, "if there is no longer a viable marriage, the question of
fault, of 'guilt' or 'innocence,' is irrelevant."169 This contradicts
New York's- fault-based law when an agreement to separate is

unattainable. 170

164 See Silverman v. Silverman, 632 N.Y.S. 2d 393, 397 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (citing 1967
Divorce Reform Act as precluding parties from remedy when they have committed
adultery); see, e.g., Recht v. Recht, 321 N.Y.S.2d 395,396 (App. Div. 1971) (denying decree
of divorce granted where both parties committed adultery). But see Hall v. Hall, 208
N.Y.S. 814, 814 (App. Div. 1924) (granting absolute divorce when both parties committed
adultery).
165 See Lyons v. Lyons, 589 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (App. Div. 1992) (stating spouse must
prove abandoning spouse unjustifiably refused to fulfill basic obligations arising from
marriage contract for one year); see also George M. v. Mary Ann M., 567 N.Y.S.2d 132,
133 (App. Div. 1991) (citing rule of one year); Casale v. Casale, 489 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776-77
(App.Div. 1985) (holding conduct must be unjustified). See generally Nicholson v.
Nicholson, 449 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 1982) (holding divorce cause of action could not be
sustained on ground of constructive abandonment).
166 See Murphy v. Murphy, 683 N.Y.S. 2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1999) (citing two
incidents between parties involving excessive drinking, name-calling, accusations and
recriminations); see also Arunas v. Arunas, 644 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (App. Div. 1996)
(holding conduct consisting of offensive name calling, disputes over finances, failure to
speak or communicate for periods of time, and failure to sympathize do not meet standard
necessary for a divorce). See generally Doyle v. Doyle, 625 NY.S.2d 693-94 (App. Div.
1995) (holding that defendant's conduct must rise to level of being unsafe or improper).
167 256 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 1970).
168 See Varreris v. Fisher, 632 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (dismissing suit when
both parties commit adulterous affairs); Lyons v. Lyons, 187 A.D.2d at 416 (stating that
action for withholding conjugal relations must be for minimum of one year); see also
Tuttman v. Kattan, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 651 (App. Div. 1948) (holding verbal abuse is not
sufficient for divorce).
169 Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d at 34.
170 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (West 2001) (giving six ways action for divorce can
be granted); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 172 A.D.2d 719, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (stating
law does not allow divorce on basis that party was compelled to leave her spouse). See
generally Kern v. Kern, 495 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (App. Div. 1985) (finding fault based
divorce where spouse's emotional outbreaks were precipitated by her abuse of alcohol).
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2. The New York Law Cannot Justify Permanent Denial of a
Fundamental Right
Thus, the New York law creates a statutory classification of
persons who cannot exercise a fundamental right.' 7 ' Those
denied divorce are permanently deprived of their associational
and decisional freedom to divorce and re-marry by the
overreaching intrusion of the state in their personal lives. 72
"When a statutory classification significantly interferes with a
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests."'173 If New York divorce law is to
be Constitutionally valid, there must be sufficiently important
state interests. 174 These interests must be of sufficient merit to
justify denying the right to marriage and divorce, which are
association and decisional freedom guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.175
Since New York has recognized the need for extrication from a
"dead marriage," there is no rational justification for requiring
denial of associational freedoms that other citizens are imbued
with. 176 Not only does this violate substantive due process, equal
protection issues may arise as well, since the state is condoning
disparate treatment for similarly situated individuals.177
Furthermore, Eisenbrandt and Roe make clear that the
substantive due process protections identified in Griswold were
rights accruing to individuals, and not solely to married
couples.178 Therefore the Constitutional rights recognized in
Gleason should be available equally to all.179
While almost every state legislature has addressed the
problem of the individual unable to secure a divorce in a nonfunctional marriage, 80 New York does not give such individuals

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

See supra, nn. 118-147 & accompanying text.
See supra, nn. 118-150 & accompanying text.
Zablock, 434 U.S. at 388.
See supra, nn. 118-142 & accompanying text.
See genermflyN.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 2000).
See supra,n. 161 & accompanying text.
See supra,notes 118-150 & accompanying text.
See supranotes 93-101 & accompanying text.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
180 See suprann.2-3 & accompanying text.
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any remedy.' 8 ' Since these individuals are suffering permanent
deprivation as a result of the state's monopoly on marital
dissolution, their deprivation would bring them within the
Boddie infirmity criteria. 182
3. The Divorce Law Fails to Accomplish Its Goals
While inflicting permanent deprivation on some individuals,
the New York divorce laws cannot claim to satisfactorily
accomplish state interests.18 3 Despite the liberalization of the
1966 law, the New York legal system still wrestles with the "chief
evils" of perjury and evasion that the 1966 reform law were
designed to correct. In contested divorce actions based on fault
grounds where there is reason to destroy credibility, perjury is
still commonplace according to New York divorce lawyers. 184 The
evasive route of migratory divorce still remains to those who are
permanently barred from securing a New York divorce. 8 5
Moreover, this evasion appears to be condoned by the Supreme
Court.1 86 Additionally, the permanent deprivation to divorce is
contradictory to public policy, which finds it socially and morally
offensive to keep couples locked in dead marriages.1 8 7 Thus, the
New York divorce law is defective because it deprives a
fundamental liberty right guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment and this encroachment does not satisfy strict
scrutiny analysis. S

181 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 2000).
182 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375-76 (stating where state has monopoly over methods of
dispute settlement, it infringes on defendants' rights).
183 See supra,an. 159-170 & accompanying text.
184 KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE 62-64 (1996) (discussing common tactic
of perjury in New York divorce proceedings).
185 See, e.g., Zweig v. Zweig, 154 Vt. 468 (Sup.Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942
(1990) (holding that divorce where parties had been living apart for fifteen years was not
barred by New York resjudicata,which denied divorce on fault grounds).
186 See Zweig v. Zweig, 498 U.S. 942 (1990) (denying certiorari to defendant-appellant
whose was divorced in Vermont after denial of divorce in New York).
187 See Gleason, 256 N.E.2d at 516 (stating that to compel couples to stay in dead
marriages is not in best interests of the parties or society).
188 See Zablocki 434 U.S at 395 (holding Wisconsin statute unconstitutional under
Fourteenth Amendment because it interfered with fundamental right to marry, and it
could not be justified on basis of state interest).
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IV.THE ENIGMA OF THE NEW YORK FAULT-BASED LAW VIS-A-VIS
THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY

According to Lenore Weitzman's study of the California nofault divorce law, women were adversely affected economically by
no-fault law. 8 9 The economic effect was felt in two ways: first,
loss of leverage in property settlement negotiations, and second,
as a result of division of property without regard to the fault of
the parties. 19 1
A. The "Weitzman Thesis" That No-FaultCaused Women to Lose
Leverage in Divorce
The Weitzman Thesis posits that fault-based divorce gave
women who were otherwise economically dependent on their
spouses, leverage in the economic outcome of divorce. 192 The
thesis first assumes that the husband is seeking the divorce, and
that the wife would not herself seek a divorce.a93 Under the New
189 See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 26 (stating consequences of no-fault divorce law
fall most heavily on economically weaker wife); see also Biondi, supra note 106, at 624
(noting reform of fault based divorce laws is less equitable in system where women are at
economic disadvantage compared to men); Marsha Garrison, Equitable Distribution in
New York: Results and Reform: Good Intentions Gone Awry. The Impact of New York
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 633 (1991)
(discussing effect of 1960's divorce reform on women's declining per capita income and
standard of living following divorce).
191See WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that under previous law, property
awards were linked to fault); see also Biondi, supra note 108, at 620-21 (stating fault
based divorce gives women added leverage by facilitating greater beneficial settlements,
receipt of greater economic shares of property and spousal support, and creation of false
fault grounds in situations where only husband wants divorce but cannot obtain one
without his wife's approval); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology,
Contradictionand Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of
the Consequences ofDivorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 801-802 (1983) (discussing argument
that no-fault divorce decreases economically dependent woman's bargaining power and
prevents sympathetic courts from responding to her economically disadvantaged
situation).
192 See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 26 (stating that "Itihe no-fault rules have
eliminated the lever that lawyers used under the old law to get decent economic
settlements for wives."); see also Biondi, supra note 108, at 620 (noting that fault based
divorce provides leverage for economically disadvantaged spouses, usually women, to
obtain economic support from their spouses); Winner, supra note 184, at 34 (arguing that
"[wihen a man no longer had to seek his wife's consent for a divorce, women lost their
leverage in divorce settlements").
193 See WEITZAN supranote 2, at 27-29 (noting New York divorce statistics actually
indicate more women seek divorce than men). But see Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,Divorce,
and Quasi Rents: Or, "TGave Him the Best Years ofMy Life", 16 J. LEGAL STuD. 267, 268
(1987) (arguing present value of wife's human capital contribution to marriage declines
faster and earlier than husband's, thus inducing him to seek divorce first).
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York fault law, the wife can contest the divorce and the grounds
would likely fail for a lack of fault. She could also threaten to
counterclaim for divorce and air the husband's fault at a public
trial.194 This resistance and threat of trial are said to have given
her leverage otherwise lost in a no-fault regime when faced with
a divorce action by her spouse. 195
While fault-based divorce might have allowed for this tactic, it
would seem to be counter to the legislative intent as articulated
in the 1966 Committee Report.196 In at least one place the
legislators were concerned about "avaricious wives" taking
actions merely as negotiation strategies.197
The legislators
characterized such actions, not as leverage, but as extortion.1 98
Based on this legislative intent, women's groups who have fought
to keep New York divorce fault-based as leverage do not have a
legally tenable position.' 9 9
194 See WEITZMAN, supranote 2, at 9 (indicating threats of exposing culpable spouse's
actions at public trial persuaded parties to agree to out of court financial settlement); see
also Biondi, supra note 108, at 620-21 (explaining when fault ground exists, wife may
demand settlement by threatening public trial); Winner, supranote 184, at 34 (concluding
that whereas women had leverage in divorce settlements under fault-based regimes, nofault divorce has allowed powerful party to blackmail his/her spouse).
195 See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 9 (indicating threats of exposing culpable spouse's
actions at public trial persuaded parties to agree to out of court financial settlement); see
also Biondi, supra note 108, at 620-21 (explaining when fault ground exists, wife may
demand settlement by threatening public trial); Winner, supranote 184, at 34 (concluding
that whereas women had leverage in divorce settlements under fault-based regimes, nofault divorce has allowed powerful party to blackmail his/her spouse).
196 Joint Legislative Comm. On Matrimonial and Family Law, No. 8, at 87 (N.Y.
1966).
197 See id.
198 See id.; [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 1647 to 16-48 (asserting recommendation of Joint Committee to preclude greedy spouse from
extorting large sums of money in form of property settlement); Peter J. Galasso,
Matrimonial Law Struck a Chord, N.Y.L.J., July 12, 2000, at 2 (stating use of noneconomic basis to exact economic benefit seems to fit definition of 'extortion'); see also
Alexandra Leichter, The Probem of Getting the 'Get, Impact of Jewish Divorce Law on
Matrimonial Litigation, MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, July 1998, at 4 (noting New York's
"Get Law" enables courts to award larger proportionate interest in marital property
and/or increase spousal support award to wives whose husbands would otherwise attempt
extortion in exchange for "the get').
199 See [1 Matrimonial Actions] NEW YORK CIvIL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 16-47 to
16-48 (stating Advisory Committee "felt that the necessity for the plaintiff to prove an
unjustified leaving by the defendant,... was sufficient protection"); Oliver Koppell, Lo
Defense of Divorce Reform 1990, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1990, at 2 (opining "objectionis] to
divorce on no-fault grounds is the loss of the 'leverage' [that is] now in the hands of the
party against whom the divorce is sought. A less polite expression for this 'leverage' is the
opportunity for extortion"). See generalyGaryStein, Jail Worked on Ex Who Didn't 'Get'
It SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Aug. 30, 1996, at 1B (discussing husband's
tremendous leverage in Jewish divorce negotiations because only he is empowered to give
"the get").
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B. PropertyDivision by JudcialAward DiscountsFault as a
Criteriain Redistribution
While current New York divorce law was enacted in 1966,
before the passage of the reform oriented 1970 California no-fault
divorce law, New York property division law was enacted in 1980
and reflected a no-fault perspective. 2 00 Under this law,
consideration of the fault of the parties with regard to property
redistribution will only be considered where the marital
misconduct is judged "egregious."201 Therefore, when a divorce is
granted, even under a fault ground, fault is rarely germane to the
determination of property division.202 Leaving the fairness of
New York's property division law aside, the inapposite premises
of these intertwined statutes are irreconcilable.203 Ironically, in
many states where it is possible to obtain a no-fault divorce, fault
will be one of the factors used in the property division. 204 This
200 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(b)(5), (d)(13) (Consol. 2000) (directing courts to
consider "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper");
Freed & Brandes, supra note 1, at 22 (criticizing 1966 reform as inadequate and falling
short of meeting all legitimate desires and needs of trouble families). See generally
Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, Symposium, Sex, Lies and Dissipation: The Discourse of
Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2534 (1994) (indicating trend toward "fault
blindness," with statutes of one quarter of the states using general fault-based factors as
one of many relevant considerations in property distribution).
201 See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718 (N.Y. 1985) (noting marital fault
should be considered in equitable distribution of marital property in egregious cases
which shock conscience of court); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 510 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (App.
Div 1987) (calculating fault only where misconduct was so egregious as to shock
conscience of court), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 601 (1987); see, e.g., Havell v. Islam, 718
N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding pattern of domestic violence, if properly
proven, is just and proper factor to be weighed in equitable distribution of property).
202 See Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (App. Div. 1984) (stating
occasions in which fault should be considered in determining distribution of property will
be very rare and will involve situations in which "marital misconduct is so egregious or
uncivilized as to bespeak of blatant disregard of marital relationship"); Jacobs, supra note
2, at 166 (noting fault has been banished from most divorce proceedings and replaced by
new criteria to determine property division); Cerisse Anderson,. Lower StandardSet For
Evidence of Abuse; Pattern of Violence Ended in Attack with Barbell,N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19,
2000, at 1 (explaining New York's general rule which excludes marital fault when
considering equitable distribution except for "egregious cases that shock the conscience" of
court).
203 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 2000) (listing six grounds for divorce
action: cruel and inhumane treatment, abandonment, confinement in prison, adultery,
one year separation decree or a written separation agreement); Biickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d
at 113 (holding considerations of marital fault are irrelevant to basic assumptions
underlying equitable distribution law such that each party has made contributions to
marital partnership and upon its dissolution each is entitled to his or her fair share);
Jacobs, supra note 2, at 167 (noting men are routinely viewed as responsible for accretion
of marital assets and therefore receive larger percentage of assets upon divorce).
204 See O'B0ien, 66 N.Y.2d at 589 (holding court may consider marital fault just and
proper factor in equitable distribution); Biickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (recognizing
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further undermines the public policy justification for New York
fault-based divorce law since fault is a basis on which a divorce is
granted, but it is not a basis for the property division. 20 5 The
distributive award can result in a lopsided distribution, awarding
the "guilty" spouse a greater share of the property due to his
2 06
greater economic contribution to the marriage.
CONCLUSION
The interests of the state cannot be said to justify the New
York fault-based divorce statute because it impinges on
fundamental Constitutional freedoms protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the divorce statute dating from
1966 is so flawed as to contradict its own stated purposes, as
expressed by the legislative committee report and articulated by
the Gleason court.
Moreover, the divorce statute is irreconcilable with the no-fault
tenets of the New York's property division law, it's corollary
statute. The sanguine effect of fault as providing leverage in the
bargaining process to the older female spouse cannot be
sustained under the legislature's stated aversion to such
tactics.Nor can a statute that infringes on Constitutional rights
be sustained based on the pretext that it affords leverage to the
disadvantaged spouse in an adversarial arena.
If the divorce law produces unjust financial consequences, then
marital fault in some cases by virtue of its extraordinary nature may be relevant and
should be considered when distributing marital property upon dissolution of marriage);
HOMER HARRISON CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, §
16.03 at 182 & n.20 (2d ed. 1988) (allowing fault to be considered in equitable distribution
of property in States of Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming, but Florida
and Virginia will limit consideration of marital misconduct with economic impact).
205 See N.Y. DOM REL. LAW § 236(b)(5), (d)(13) (Consol. 2000) (stating court may
consider any factor which is just and proper in property division). See generally Winner,
supra note 172, at 34 (noting that women's groups have fought against bills with
provisions that offer economic protection to women when these bills have included nofault provisions). But see Nicola v. Nicolla, 513 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (App. Div. 1987)
(noting allegations of adultery would not affect equitable distribution because no apparent
extraordinary circumstances existed).
206 See WEITZMAN, supranote 2, at 15-16; see also Kobylack v Kobylack, 442 N.Y.S.2d
392, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (concluding fault should be used "only as a consideration to tilt
the balance where there are insufficient assets to make the parties economically whole"),
reversed on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d 399, 402 (1983).
See generally Giannola v.
Giannola, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding while fault can be relevant it
would not preclude distributive award since under equitable distribution "each party to
the marriage is entitled to take with him, that which he contributed").
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the state lawmakers must examine the Equitable Distribution
Law. First, it must reconsider the bar on lifetime alimony that
results in inadequate financial protections to older homemakers
who may not be able to find employment at advanced ages.
Second, the legislature must reexamine its reluctance to accept a
partnership analogy for the marriage contract. The question
must be addressed whether it is equitable to continue to make
asset distributions based on contribution to the marital assets
that do not presume a 50-50 split, and usually result in larger
property awards to economically successful husbands because
women generally earn lower wages in the workplace while
If
assuming the greater burden of family responsibilities.
property distributions were based on more equitable principles, it
would not be necessary to resort to leverage to achieve fairer
property division outcomes by means of the constitutionally
flawed fault-based ground requirements. There is simply no
acceptable justification for the fault-based regime and it is high
time that New York reformed its divorce law as almost every
other state in the nation has done, so that its statutes comport
with Constitutional imperatives that guarantee individuals the
fundamental rights of association and personal autonomy.

